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Abstract: We apply a novel technique to identify systemically important regions 
(SIRs) in a global network that shows a reduced degree of concentration and the 
development of a multi-centered structure. We observe that when a region is more 
connected to other regions, it is exposed to a higher level of systemic risk. This 
condition holds even more strongly for non-systemically important regions. However, 
for SIRs, interconnectedness is not significantly associated with systemic risk. Our 
empirical evidence suggests that an increase in interconnectedness at the regional 
level, together with a decrease in interconnectedness for a single pivotal center, may 
reduce the aggregate systemic risk at the global level. 
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1. Introduction 
During the subprime crisis, the risks derived from the bankruptcies of subprime 
mortgage lenders spread rapidly throughout global financial markets and triggered the 
notorious financial crisis of 2007-2009. Due to the devastating contagion and 
destructive power of the subprime crisis, systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) became a well-recognized concept, and the systemic risk of contagion among 
such institutions has become a hot topic among scholars (Fouque & Langsam, 2013; 
Yun & Moon, 2014; Xu et al., 2018). In 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the Bank for International Settlements submitted a 
research report on systemic risk (FIB, 2009 hereafter for brevity) to the G20 nations, 
noting that interconnectedness is an important determinant of systemic risk. Systemic 
risk is certainly not limited to individual financial institutions (Acharya et al., 2016; 
Billio et al., 2012). Instead, such risk involves the entire worldwide financial system 
and can potentially manifest in the real economic system, a collection of 
interconnected countries and regions (regions hereafter) that have mutually economic 
relationships through which losses can quickly proliferate during periods of financial 
distress (Giglio, Kelly, & Pruitt, 2016).  
In this study, we expand the literature on systemic risk to regions and analyze the 
systemic risk of contagion from a macro or global perspective. Giglio, Kelly, and 
Pruitt (2016) argue that systemic risk in the financial sector is informative about 
increased downside macroeconomic risk in the future. In this era of economic 
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globalization, regions have become increasingly connected. The management of 
global systemic risk is a pressing issue that requires regional coordination. As such, 
we choose regions as the object of this study, treating them as nodes in the networks 
that are exposed to the systemic risk of contagion, and we attempt to identify 
important nodes, i.e. systemically important regions (SIRs). We define SIRs as 
regions that are pivotal in the transfer of systemic risk. There is limited research on 
systemic risk that uses regional data. Therefore, this study considers regions as 
economic systems and defines systemic risk as the exposure to the potential 
dysfunction or collapse of the entire system. Financial institutions within a country or 
region usually share similar features, such as rules, regulations, and culture. Our 
results on regional systemic risk complement the literature on SIFIs and systemic risk. 
Research on systemic risk remains limited to developed regions due to the availability 
of data on interactions among financial institutions. In contrast, we are able to provide 
additional empirical evidence of systemic risk in emerging markets by integrating 
financial systems as a whole at the regional level. 
Most important, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to introduce the 
idea that systemic risk should be measured at the global level, instead of only at the 
regional level as in most of the literature. We argue that an increase in systemic risk at 
the regional level potentially reduces aggregate systemic risk at the global level. The 
underlying logic is that an increase in the interconnectedness of NSIRs increases their 
systemic risk. Meanwhile, the increase in NSIRs’ relative interconnectedness leads to 
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a decrease in the global concentration of interconnectedness, thus reducing aggregate 
systemic risk. This argument holds true even when NSIRs’ increase in 
interconnectedness is large enough for them to become SIRs. In this case, the global 
concentration of interconnectedness is reduced more significantly. Note that this 
argument implicitly assumes that global interconnectedness remains stable and 
implies that the increase in SIRs’ interconnectedness lessens that of the center that 
serves as a pivot. This assumption is plausible because in the subsequent section we 
show that global interconnectedness remains almost unchanged during our sample 
period. Thus, measuring systemic risk at the level of individual financial institutions 
could paint an incomplete picture because such risk comes at the cost of increased 
systemic risk for the entire system.  
By way of preview, this study finds the following. First, at the global level, we find 
that there is a positive relationship between the concentration of a network and 
systemic risk: the more concentrated the network, the higher its systemic risk. Second, 
for a specific region, we find that the impact of inter-regional connections on systemic 
risk is different between NSIRs and SIRs. For NSIRs, the more connected a region, 
the higher its systemic risk. However, for SIRs we do not find a significant 
relationship between interconnectedness and systemic risk. One potential reason is 
that SIRs are able to use their increased connections with other regions to outflow risk 
and decrease their systemic risk. This evidence complements the study of Haldane 
(2009) on the relationship between interconnectedness and systemic risk. Our results 
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suggest that if NSIRs are connected with more regions, their systemic risk increases. 
Therefore, NSIRs should be aware of the negative side-effects of connecting 
themselves with numerous regions. Interestingly, our results also suggest that SIRs’ 
higher GDP and higher international status of their currencies contribute positively to 
their interconnectedness, while larger populations have a positive impact on NSIRs’ 
interconnectedness. Overall, our study has important policy implications for regions 
that may consider managing potential systemic risk through above mentioned 
channels. We further show that an increase of interconnectedness at the regional level, 
together with a decrease of interconnectedness for a single pivotal center, may reduce 
aggregate systemic risk at the global level. Thus, a multi-centered global economic 
network, rather than a single pivotal center, can reduce systemic risk. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three important folds. First, we analyze the 
characteristics of global interconnected networks using regional data. We extend the 
literature on systemic risk using the regional level data while extant literature 
generally focuses on the data of financial institutions. Special attention is paid to the 
Greater China area. This region has now become the second largest global economy 
and evolved dramatically over the past decades. Second, we apply novel techniques in 
the study of systemic risk. We use orthogonal pulse analyses to study the impact of 
the network structure on the systemic risk at the global level and also from the 
regional perspective. We employ the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to identify some 
important factors that influence regions’ interconnectedness, which leads to the 
6 
 
differences between SIRs and NSIRs. Third, we find empirical evidence suggesting 
that an increase in systemic risk at the regional level potentially reduces the aggregate 
systemic risk at the global level. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review and hypotheses development. Section 3 uses the minimum spanning tree 
(MST) method to create an annual snapshot of regional networks and their structures, 
and then identifies the SIRs. Section 4 discusses the regional and global impact of 
network structure on systemic risk. Section 5 uses the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
to investigate the main causes of the difference in interconnectedness between SIRs 
and NSIRs, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Research on interconnectedness mainly focuses on the interconnectedness between 
financial institutions (Allen & Gale, 2000; Cabrales et al., 2014; Elliott et al., 2014; 
Nier et al., 2007). Research finds that interconnectedness is caused by the overlap of 
bank loan portfolios (Cai et al., 2018), correlations in financial assets (Bisias et al., 
2012), and business contacts (Markose et al., 2012), among other factors. These 
factors are potential channels through which systemic risk may be transmitted. 
Financial institutions in one region have obvious interconnectedness mainly due to 
their business and network contacts. When the financial institutions in one region 
engage in contact with those of other regions, they become affected by their economic 
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strategies, financial regulatory policies, and other external factors. Therefore, when 
investigating the systemic risk of contagion, the results of such regional analyses can 
provide additional insight for the literature. Research on regions’ systemic risk is 
limited, however. Garratt et al. (2011) use an information theory map equation to 
analyze the banking system of 21 regions, measuring the risk facing financial 
networks in different periods. Most research indicates that the development of 
globalization, no matter how strong the interconnectedness among institutions and 
regions, results in the transmission of systemic risk within the same system or even 
among different systems (Bottazzi et al., 2016; Plosser, 2009; Yellen, 2013). 
Castiglionesi and Eboli (2015) find that interconnected financial networks make 
interbank interest rates more stable in normal periods but more volatile during crisis 
periods. Elliott et al. (2014) use a mutual holding model to show that the bankruptcy 
of one bank can lead to a chain reaction. 
Taking a network perspective, Eboli (2013) and Glasserman and Young (2015) point 
out that network structure has a significant impact on systemic risk. Gai et al. (2011) 
analyze the impact of financial networks’ degree of concentration and complexity on 
systemic risk. They argue that network interconnectedness and complexity increase 
systemic risk, while strict liquidity policies, macro-prudential regulations, and extra 
requirements on SIFIs can enhance a network’s ability to guard against potential risk. 
Acemoglu et al. (2015) show that a closely interconnected network is beneficial for 
the stability of the system when negative shocks are sufficiently small. However, 
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when a negative shock is relatively large, interconnectedness makes it easier for risk 
to contaminate other nodes, increasing the instability of the system. The literature also 
suggests that when there is a linear or log-linear economic interaction, the stability of 
the system no longer relies on a network being closely interconnected but rather on 
the symmetry of the connected nodes (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Acemoglu et al., 2015).  
Concentration is an important aspect of structure. When regions transfer risk in a 
highly concentrated network, a small number of pivots become the only transmission 
nodes, leaving them overwhelmed by the risk. Also, once these pivots collapse, 
connected regions are negatively affected and unable to transfer risk to other regions. 
Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: At the global level, a more concentrated network structure aggravates 
global systemic risk. 
For a particular region, its interconnectedness (with other regions) might also 
influence systemic risk itself. More specifically, the effect may run in two directions 
(Haldane, 2009). On the one hand, when the region is closely connected with other 
regions, it is easier for this region to transmit its own risk and to thus reduce its 
overall risk. This transmission process helps stabilize the system of this particular 
region (Allen & Gale, 2000; Freixas et al., 2000). On the other hand, the regions 
closely connected with crisis regions are exposed to more counterparties and are thus 
more vulnerable to contamination, leading to increased systemic risk in non-crisis 
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regions (Blume et al., 2011; Blume et al., 2013; Nier et al., 2007; Vivier-Lirimont, 
2006). We argue that the impact of interconnectedness on the systemic risk of a 
particular region depends on whether the strengths of that region outweigh its 
weaknesses. More specifically, SIRs are able to use their increased connections with 
other regions to outflow risk and to therefore decrease the impact of systemic risk. In 
contrast, NSIRs are relatively financially weak and can be negatively contaminated by 
their crisis counterparties. Thus, if NSIRs are connected to more nodes, i.e., showing 
higher interconnectedness, they are subject to higher systemic risk. This leads to the 
follow hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: At the regional level, the interconnectedness of SIRs (NSIRs) alleviates 
(aggravates) the effect of systemic risk on a specific region. 
We proceed to examine how the interconnectedness of regions influences systemic 
risk at both the global level and the regional level. We first study the factors that are 
thought to have a potential impact on the interconnectedness of regions. The empirical 
evidence can also shed light on the management of regions’ systemic risk, and it is 
possible to address some of these factors from the policymaker’s perspective. 
The literature suggests that various factors, such as the scale of the economy, exports 
and imports, and the international status of currency, affect the interconnectedness of 
regions (Kali & Reyes, 2010, Müller, 2011, Armijo et al., 2014; Centeno et al., 2015). 
Müller (2011) and Armijo et al. (2014) suggest using GDP to represent the scale of 
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the economy and they find that the larger the scale, the greater the possibility that a 
region connects directly with other regions. Kali and Reyes (2010) argue that 
international trading networks are a good measure of regional interconnectedness. 
They suggest that the scale of exports and imports can be used as a proxy for 
international trading networks and to observe the transmission of financial risk. 
Centeno et al. (2015) use case studies to show that international trading is the source 
of systemic risk. Armijo et al. (2014) find that international currency status has a large 
effect on a region’s systemic importance. When the currency of a certain region is 
internationally important, other regions hold large amounts of its currency, increasing 
the region’s interconnectedness. Armijo et al. (2014) also find that population size is 
an important factor in interconnectedness, along with political stability, the soundness 
of the legal system, and international status. If policies can be designed to shape these 
factors with regard to interconnectedness, it is possible to implement systemic risk 
management at the regional level. 
3. Global Network Structure and Systemically Important Regions 
3.1 Minimum Spanning Tree 
The literature uses alternative methods to analyze the network structure of financial 
institutions, such as topological graphs (Markose et al., 2012), Granger causality 
(Billio et al., 2012), and weighted vector graphs (Acemoglu et al., 2015). As we 
intend to find the strongest and most direct network connections among regions, we 
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choose the MST method, following Ouyang and Liu (2014) and Liu and Modarres 
(2017). Assuming that every region is a node, we can use the MST method to identify 
the strongest and most direct connection for each node in the network. Systemic risk 
is most likely to transmit through this network. Ouyang and Liu (2014) argue that in 
MSTs, the more connected lines a region has, the more systemically important it is. 
Similarly, in the global network presented in this study, we argue that the more 
connected lines a network has, the more interconnected the world is.  
A distance matrix of regions is needed to calculate the MSTs that should reflect the 
economic interaction among regions rather than physical distance. Following 
Schweitzer et al. (2009), we use Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to construct a 
distance matrix. When one region’s systemic risk increases, the other region is 
affected negatively due to their mutual economic connections. FDI is a suitable proxy 
for interconnectedness between two regions for three reasons. First, FDI 
comprehensively reflects economic interactions (Bathelt & Li, 2013) and influences 
multiple aspects of the economy (Holland & Pain, 1998) such as economic growth 
(Barrell & Pain, 1997; Belloumi, 2014) and exports (Pain & Wakelin, 1998). In 
contrast, the variable of imports and exports only reflects interactions in commodities. 
Interbank debt holdings only reflect the interconnectedness of the financial sector. 
Second, FDI is positively correlated with other factors that suggest 
interconnectedness, including imports and exports. Here we assume that the two 
regions with a similar FDI should have a similar extent of interaction in investments, 
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trading, and debt-holdings, among others factors, because these factors are closely 
related. For example, if American companies increase FDI investments in the UK, 
they are more likely to get loans directly from British banks. Third, the complete 
matrix of FDI among regions is available, and the data cover a relatively long period 
compared with other variables. Therefore, FDI is a reasonable choice for constructing 
a distance matrix to measure regions’ interconnectedness. 
The detailed steps for obtaining the MSTs are as follows. First, we get the distance 
matrix as noted above. Assume u and v are two different regions; (u, v) represents the 
line connecting u and v; and ( , )w u v  represents the length of this line, i.e. the financial 
distance between two regions. The largest FDI among all regions is m and uvFDI
represents the total FDI of region u in region v; then the element in the uth row and 
vth column is ( , )= uvw u v m FDI− , i.e., the higher the FDI, the more connected the 
two regions and the smaller the distance. Assuming that every region is a node, for a 
network with n regions, MST is the minimal connected sub-network of the original 
network. This minimally connected sub-network includes all of the n nodes of the 
original network and its lines keep the network connected, with the total distance 
minimized and with an absence of cycles. In other words, assuming that V represents 
the set comprising all nodes and E represents the set comprising all connected graphs, 
then in the undigraph G = (V, E), if there exists a T that is a subset of E, an undigraph, 
and that minimizes the total length of connected lines 
, )
( ) ( , )
u v
w T w u v=∑
（
, then T is 
G’s MST. 
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The FDI data are collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Country 
Data reports, a database that includes 60 regions from 1989 to 2015. The sample 
regions are depicted in Figure 1 as black. The sample includes 19 Asian, 25 European, 
three North American, seven South American, four African, and two Oceanian 
regions. As can be seen in Figure 1, the sample regions are representative because 
they include the main global economies, including the US, the European Union, 
China, Japan, and others. The sample years are from 1989 to 2015, totaling 27 years. 
 
 
  
  
Sample regions        Regions not in the sample 
Figure 1. Sample Regions 
3.2 Network Features 
3.2.1 Features of the Global Network 
The MSTs of the global financial network are calculated from 1989 to 2015, with the 
total number of lines for each year shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Total Number of Connected Lines of MSTs 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 and later 
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Number 108 108 106 112 116 114 118 
Due to space limitations, only the networks of representative years are reported in 
Figure 2.  
 
    1989     1995         2000     2010    2015 
Figure 2. Global Financial Network Derived from MST (Representative Years) 
According to Table 1 and Figure 2, during the sample period on a global level, the 
total number of network lines increases slightly from 108 in 1989 to 118 in 1995. The 
total number of lines is the same after 1995. However, Figure 2 shows that these 
networks have been developing from having only limited number of large centers to 
having numerous smaller centers, i.e., revealing a trend toward less concentrated 
networks. For example, in 1989, there was only one super center in the US with 24 
connected lines. For 2015, there were more centers including the Netherlands, France, 
Japan, Germany, and mainland China. This implies that the United States’ super-
center status has weakened over time and that the global financial market has 
developed into a multi-centered network. Globally, the total number of network lines 
has only changed slightly; however, there are increasingly more centers in the world’s 
interconnected network. 
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3.2.2 Features of Regions 
At the regional level, the interconnectedness of each region changes dynamically. 
Table 2 reports the top-10 regions with the most average connected lines over our 
sample period. 
Table 2. Top-10 Regions with the Most Average Connected Lines 
Year U.S. Netherlands Germany U.K. France 
Mainland 
China 
Japan Spain Sweden Singapore 
1989 24 4 6 6 4 2 3 1 3 1 
1991 19 4 6 7 10 3 4 1 2 1 
1993 23 6 5 3 8 9 1 4 2 1 
1995 22 5 6 3 5 7 5 2 4 1 
1997 24 1 5 2 10 5 5 4 3 1 
1999 23 7 5 5 4 5 2 3 3 1 
2001 19 8 5 7 5 6 2 2 4 2 
2003 16 5 8 7 5 7 3 2 1 4 
2005 15 4 7 9 5 4 4 4 2 3 
2007 16 12 3 7 4 1 3 5 3 2 
2009 14 13 5 5 4 3 2 1 1 3 
2011 12 9 4 7 3 2 4 4 1 4 
2013 17 10 6 2 6 5 7 3 4 2 
2015 17 11 6 1 7 5 7 3 4 1 
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Among these regions, only mainland China is a developing region while all of the 
others are developed regions. The US is consistently the single super-pivot directly 
connected to the most regions, although the number of its connecting lines has 
decreased since 2000. On the contrary, the Netherlands shows increasing connections, 
having reached second place in the rankings since 2007. Germany and France show 
relatively stable connections while the UK follows a similar path as the US. For the 
Asia Pacific region, we identify three regions, mainland China, Japan and Singapore, 
in the top-10 global rankings. Mainland China ranked sixth in 2015, albeit with 
significant volatility during the sample period. Before 1994, the number of China’s 
connecting network lines increased rapidly, with a significant drop after 2003, and 
then China has remained in sixth place globally since 2012. In 2007, the only region 
directly connected to mainland China was Hong Kong. Recently, the number of 
network lines that connect to Japan, Spain, and Sweden has significantly increased. 
Singapore was relatively stable in the 1990s but has experienced volatility since 2000. 
Table 3 shows all regions with more than one line for 2015. Similarly, except for 
mainland China, all of the other regions are developed regions. Seventeen regions 
were directly connected to the US in 2015, implying that it has an irreplaceable status 
as a pivot. For this period, the regions with which mainland China are mostly 
economically connected are Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, thus 
increasing the likelihood of systemic risk transmitting among them. Table 3 also 
shows that there are three regions in the Asia Pacific region, specifically mainland 
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China, Japan and Australia, with their number of connecting lines larger than 1 in 
2015. 
Table 3. Regions with Number of Lines Larger Than 1 in 2015 
Region US Netherland France Japan Germany 
Mainland 
China 
Austria Sweden Spain Australia Belgium Slovakia 
Number 
of lines 
connected 
17 11 7 7 6 5 4 4 3 2 2 2 
3.2.3 Features of the Greater China Area 
Different regions connect with Greater China each year, mostly within the Pacific 
Basin area. As Table 4 shows, mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have a long 
history of interconnectedness. Hong Kong and mainland China are closely connected 
and mutually dependent on each other, with implications for the transmission of 
systemic risk. Before the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, mainland China had more 
connections with the Philippines, the US, and Vietnam, but this was not so after the 
financial crisis. Mainland China has maintained a relatively high degree of 
interconnectedness with multiple regions since 1995, especially in the most recent 
three years.  
Correspondingly, Hong Kong connects mainly with mainland China in the sample 
period. The interconnectedness between Hong Kong and the US was notable only 
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before and during the financial crisis but diminished after 2008. Mainland China is 
also the most connected region for Taiwan. Taiwan only connected with the US 
before 1991, but their direct connection was lost in 1992 when Taiwan began to 
connect with mainland China. The connection between Taiwan and mainland China 
was interrupted in 2006 to 2008 but reestablished after 2009.  
Therefore, we find significant interconnectedness among mainland China, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan. For these three regions, their systemic risk changes 
synchronously. Mainland China is the most important region of the Greater China. In 
most sample years, mainland China is the only connected region for Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.  
Table 4. Regions Connected with Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
 Connected with Mainland China Connected with HK Connected with Taiwan 
1989 Hong Kong, Japan Mainland China US 
1990 HK, Philippines, US Mainland China US 
1991 HK, Japan, Philippines Mainland China US 
1992 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Peru Mainland China, Thailand Mainland China 
1993 HK, Taiwan, Korea, Philippines, US, Vietnam, KZ, Indonesia, Hungary Mainland China Mainland China 
1994 
HK, Taiwan, Korea, Philippines, US, Vietnam, KZ, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
Romania 
Mainland China, Thailand Mainland China 
1995 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Ukraine Mainland China Mainland China 
1996 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore Mainland China Mainland China, Vietnam 
1997 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, KZ Mainland China Mainland China 
1998 HK, Taiwan, Korea, US, Singapore Mainland China Mainland China 
1999 HK, Taiwan, Korea, US, Singapore Mainland China Mainland China 
2000 HK, Taiwan Mainland China, Singapore Mainland China, Vietnam 
2001 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Philippines, US Mainland China Mainland China, Vietnam 
2002 HK, Taiwan, Korea, US Mainland China Mainland China 
2003 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Iran Mainland China Mainland China 
2004 HK, Taiwan, Korea, Philippines Mainland China, US Mainland China 
2005 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea Mainland China Mainland China 
2006 HK, Korea Mainland China, US Netherland 
2007 Hong Kong Mainland China, US Netherland 
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2008 HK, Korea, South Africa Mainland China, UK US 
2009 HK, Taiwan, Korea Mainland China, Netherland Mainland China 
2010 HK, Taiwan, Singapore, Iran, Venezuela Mainland China, UK Mainland China 
2011 HK, Taiwan Mainland China, Singapore, 
Netherland 
Mainland China 
2012 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Iran, Nigeria Mainland China Mainland China, Vietnam 
2013 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore Mainland China Mainland China 
2014 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore Mainland China Mainland China 
2015 HK, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore Mainland China Mainland China 
3.3 Identification of Systemically Important Regions 
According to FIS (2009), interconnectedness is one of the major measures for 
systemic importance. It represents the importance of a region in terms of transferring 
systemic risk. If one region is highly interconnected with others, it is a pivot in the 
network. To identify SIRs, we define regions with the top 10% most connected lines 
as systemically important. According to the calculation results of the global networks 
in each sample year, the top 10% percentile cutoff is four lines. Therefore, in this 
study SIRs are defined as regions with connected lines equal to or larger than four in 
each year. Applying this standard, we identify the number of SIRs for each year as 
shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. The Number of Systemically Important Regions by Year  
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Figure 3 shows that the number of SIRs fluctuates over time but increases overall. 
The increasing magnitude becomes more significant after the subprime mortgage 
crisis period of 2008. In 2007, there were only five SIRs, including France, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US. The number of SIRs increased rapidly to ten 
in 2011. The US only showed 16 connected lines in 2007, which is the lowest number 
in its history. This may be due to other regions’ concerns over a spill-over effect from 
the United States’ financial crisis; therefore, they might have deliberately reduced 
their connections with the US. Alternatively, it could be that the American economic 
situation had actually weakened significantly before the crisis, leading to a contraction 
of interconnectedness. After the subprime crisis, the number of SIRs at the global 
level increased significantly, indicating that there were more connected centers in the 
world. The global economic market seems to be developing into a multi-centered 
network. 
3.4 Concentration of the Global Network 
Aside from the number of lines and the number of centers, concentration is another 
important feature of a network structure and signals the density of the 
interconnectedness. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)4 of the lines to 
reflect the degree of concentration, which is defined as follows: 
( )
60 60
2 2
1 1
/ =t it t it
i i
HHI ASI X RSI
= =
=∑ ∑  
                                
(1) 
                                                
4 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is usually used to measure the degree of concentration in an industry. HHI 
equals the sum of the square of market share of each individual financial institution, and can be used to measure 
the extent of a monopoly. This is similar to our definition of the concentration of networks. 
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where itASI is the number of lines connected in year t for the ith region, which is the 
extent of Absolute Interconnectedness of the region; tX is the total number of lines of 
the network in year t; itRSI  is the proportion of the number of lines of the ith region 
to tX , which is defined as the extent of the region’s Relative Interconnectedness. The 
HHIs of each year are depicted in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. HHI of the Global Network 
Generally, HHI decreases over time. This indicates that the global network consisted 
of only a small number of large centers in 1990s and gradually developed into a 
network with numerous smaller centers in the 2000s, which is consistent with the 
increase in the number of SIRs over our sample period. In other words, we witness a 
decrease in the degree of concentration in the global network and an increase in the 
number of SIRs over the past several decades. Next, we explore the impact of 
interconnectedness on the transmission of systemic risk. 
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4. The Impact of Interconnectedness on Systemic Risk 
4.1 Measures of Systemic Risk 
In this section we study the impact of regional interconnectedness on systemic risk. 
Most measures of systemic risk focus on financial institutions and their expected 
shortfalls (Acharya et al., 2017). We argue that the definition of system risk should 
recognize risk from all sources, including sovereign risk, currency risk, and banking 
sector risk. Therefore, a more comprehensive variable is needed to measure regions’ 
systemic risk. We proxy for regions’ systemic risk by using the Country Risk Score of 
the EIU5, which is denoted as riskit. The riskit is the systemic risk in year t for the ith 
region. According to the EIU, the Country Risk Score comprehensively reflects 
sovereign risk, currency risk, and banking sector risk. The higher the riskit, the higher 
the systemic risk. The descriptive statistics of riskit are presented in Table 5. As the 
Country Risk Score only starts from 1997, and as there are some missing values, we 
finally obtain a total of 1,075 observations. 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Country Risk Scores 
Regions 
Sample 
years 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Median Max Skewness Kurtosis 
60 19 1075 37.88 14.97 9 38 74 0.19 2.12 
                                                
5 The EIU-designed EIU Risk Model produces the systemic risk rate for all regions. This is the most authoritative ratio for measuring the 
systemic risk of regions.  
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4.2 Impact of Concentration on Systemic Risk at the Global Level 
We first apply orthogonal pulse analyses to test Hypothesis 1, investigating the impact 
of network concentration on systemic risk at the global level. The orthogonal pulse 
function is widely used to study the effect of one variable on others (Berument & 
Froyen, 2009; Pradhan 2015). This function not only shows the direction of the effect, 
but also shows its time lag and significance level in each year. This implies that when 
all of the other variables and residuals remain the same, the effect of a one unit 
increase in the residual of the jth variable in time t (𝜀"#) on the value of the ith 
variable at time t+s (𝑦',#)*), i.e. the orthogonal pulse function, is a function of the 
time lag s: ∂𝑦',#)*/ ∂ε"#.  
We first study the impact of network concentration on systemic risk at the global 
level. The response variable riskit is the systemic risk of region i in year t. Here, 
shocks come from changes in the concentration of the global network, i.e. HHIt. The 
results of the orthogonal pulse are depicted in Figure 5. The horizontal axis represents 
the time lag after the shock, while the vertical axis represents the number of crises in 
the sample regions for that year. The two thin black lines are the upper and lower 
bound of the 95% confidence interval and the bold black line represents the average.  
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Figure 5. Dynamic Impact of HHI of Lines on Global Systemic Risk 
In Figure 5, the HHI of lines initially produces a significantly positive effect on global 
systemic risk, and then the HHI diminishes to insignificance after five years. 
Therefore, we find strong evidence supporting Hypothesis 1, which proposed that that 
the more concentrated the network, the higher the global systemic risk. Our empirical 
results suggest that a multi-centered global economic network, rather than a single 
pivotal center, can reduce systemic risk at the global level.  
4.3 Interconnectedness of Systemic Risk at the Regional Level 
In this section we test Hypothesis 2, again using orthogonal pulse analyses. More 
specifically, we explore whether and how the number of connected lines, i.e., 
interconnectedness, influences the systemic risk of regions. As SIRs and NSIRs are 
expected to show different characteristics and performances, we split the whole 
sample into two groups: SIRs and NSIRs. We use the orthogonal pulse function to 
obtain the impact of regions on systemic risk from the number of connected lines. In 
Figure 6, the horizontal axis represents the time lag after the shock, while the vertical 
axis represents the systemic risk for the same group of regions for that year. The two 
thin black lines are the upper and lower bound of the 95% confidence interval and the 
bold black line represents the average. There are three graphs for Figure 6. Figure 6a 
shows the results for the whole sample, while Figure 6b and 6c are for NSIRs and 
SIRs, respectively.  
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(a) Whole Sample 
  
                  (b) NSIR          (c) SIR 
Figure 6. Dynamic Impact of Interconnectedness on NSIRs’ Systemic Risk 
Figure 6 shows that interconnectedness significantly increases systemic risk only for 
NSIRs because the lower bound of the confidence interval is significantly larger than 
0 at the 5% level. However, it is not significant for SIRs and the whole sample.6 
More specifically, our results indicate that for NSIRs an increase in the number of 
connected lines increases the possibility of systemic risk in the long run. Therefore, an 
increase in interconnectedness leads to higher systemic risk for NSIRs, i.e. the 
negative effect of the greater possibility of being contaminated by other regions 
                                                
6 The results of ASI and RSI are similar, so we only report those of ASI. The results of RSI are available upon 
request from the authors. 
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dominates the positive effect of the potential transfer of risk to other regions. When 
there is an additional region directly connected to a certain NSIR, systemic risk 
decreases slightly in the short run. However, after one year, systemic risk increases 
rapidly and remains significantly positive at the confidence level of 95%, peaking at 
0.04 after two years. In other words, the average Country Risk Score increases by 
0.04 in the second year after the shock. After that, the effect of the positive shock 
declines and then converges to 0 after 10 years.  
The underlying reason for the difference in significance between SIRs and NSIRs is 
perhaps that NSIRs have a limited number of connected lines. This implies a limited 
number of available channels for NSIRs to diversify and transfer risk out of their 
region. Once NSIRs become more interconnected, the negative effect of 
contamination of systemic risk from other regions dominates the positive effect of 
transferring systemic risk. In contrast, SIRs have more channels for transferring risk. 
This suggests that the positive effect of connectedness is stronger for SIRs than for 
NSIRs, and the positive effect cancels out the negative effect of contamination 
possibility for SIRs. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is only partially supported. At the 
regional level, the interconnectedness of NSIRs aggravates the impact of systemic risk 
on a specific region. We do not find a significant relationship between 
interconnectedness and systemic risk for SIRs. Our results suggest that with regard to 
systemic risk management, interconnectedness or openness is not always beneficial 
for NSIRs. Different regions should choose appropriate strategies for managing 
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systemic risk according to their own characteristics. Overall, our results suggest that 
an increase of systemic risk for a few regions might potentially reduce aggregate 
systemic risk at the global level. Measuring systemic risk at the level of individual 
institutional firms could be misleading because it comes at the cost of increasing 
systemic risk for the entire system. These findings have not been discussed in the 
literature and should be of interest to policymakers and regulators.  
5. The Main Causes of the Difference in Interconnectedness between SIRs and NSIRS 
Previous analysis shows that when NSIRs’ interconnectedness increases, their 
systemic risk also increases. However, we do not find similar evidence for SIRs. One 
potential reason is that SIRs have stronger connections that can spread risk and 
provide protection from that risk. However, there is a cost to decreasing systemic risk 
by simply reducing NSIRs’ interconnectedness. This cost results from going against 
the direction of globalization and produces numerous side effects, such as a decrease 
in social welfare (Ahmadi, 2003) and the stimulation of competition, 
entrepreneurship, and economic growth (Ching et al., 2011). One potential solution 
for NSIRs, so that they can increase their interconnectedness while not simultaneously 
increasing their systemic risk, is to develop themselves into SIRs. Our results suggest 
that SIRs are in a better position to isolate themselves from systemic risk. We thus 
attempt to identify some key factors that affect interconnectedness, so that it becomes 
possible for NSIRs to increase their interconnectedness through these channels. The 
literature suggests that the global importance of a region, in terms of the systemic risk 
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of contagion, depends on various factors including the size of the economy, trading, 
industrial structure, currency, and the legal system, among other factors. We consider 
eight factors as listed in Table 6. After removing their missing values, we obtain 858 
observations for 51 regions from 1995 to 2015. 
Table 6. Factors Affecting Interconnectedness 
Factors Definition Literature Data Source 
GDP (gdp) GDP Müller (2011), 
Armijo et al. (2014) 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Openess (imex) The sum of the proportion of 
imports and exports to GDP 
Kali & Reyes (2010),   
Centeno et al. (2015) 
Population (popu) Size of population Armijo et al. (2014) 
International status of the 
currency (currency) 
Proportion of the region’s 
currency in Official Foreign 
Exchange Reserves  
Armijo et al. (2014) COFER, IMF7 
Soundness of the legal 
system (law) 
Rule of Law Index  World Justice 
Project 
Participation in international 
organizations (un) 
The UN membership due  U.N. website  
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is used here to calculate each factor’s proportion 
of contribution to the difference between SIRs and NSIRs (Oaxaca & Ransom, 1994; 
González Álvarez & Barranquero, 2009). We use the two-fold method (Jann, 2008) to 
decompose the difference in interconnectedness between SIRs and NSIRs: 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = [𝐸 𝐹9: − 𝐸 𝐹<9: ]′𝛽∗ + [𝐸 𝐹9: ′ 𝛽9: − 𝛽∗ + 𝐸 𝐹<9: ′ 𝛽∗ − 𝛽<9: ]
 (2) 
The first part on the right hand side comprises the explanatory variables listed in 
Table 6, while the second part comprises all of the other factors that are difficult to 
                                                
7 COFER: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, see the IMF website. 
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measure or that involve unavailable data, such as political, social, cultural, and 
religious factors. We mainly consider the factors that are measurable in Table 6 based 
on the literature. The results from the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition are presented in 
Table 7. 
Table 7 suggests that there are significant differences in SIRs and NSIRs in many 
aspects. Overall, the factors considered in our model contribute 42.01% to the total 
difference in interconnectedness, significant at the 1% level. Thus our model has 
satisfactory explanatory power for the difference in interconnectedness between SIRs 
and NSIRs. GDP contributes 38.34% to the total difference and is significant at the 
1% level. We find that a high GDP is the main cause of SIRs being more connected 
than NSIRs. The second factor is status of currency, contributing 12.77%, which is 
also significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the currencies of SIRs usually have 
higher international status, making SIRs more connected. However, the contribution 
of population is negative, -2.32%, and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that 
NSIRs, which are less connected, perform better with large populations, increasing 
NSIRs’ interconnectedness.8 NSIRs are usually developing regions with relatively 
large populations. Thus, we find some empirical evidence suggesting that a large 
population is positively related to interconnectedness. Other factors are not significant 
in explaining the difference in interconnectedness between SIRs and NSIRs in our 
model. Our results suggest that it is beneficial for NSIRs to increase their 
                                                
8 Oaxaca & Ransom (1994) suggest that a negative sign indicates that the inferior group (NSIRs) outperforms the 
superior group (SIRs), and this factor narrows the gap between these two groups (Alvarez & Barranquero, 2009). 
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interconnectedness through three main channels: developing their economy 
(increasing GDP), improving their currency’s international status; and increasing the 
size of their population. When NSIRs can evolve into SIRs, they become financially 
stronger and more connected to global network channels, thereby reducing their 
vulnerability to systemic risk. 
Table 7. Results of the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 
 Coefficient t- value Percentage 
Systemically Important Regions 7.4127*** 17.88  
Non-Systemically Important Regions 1.2787*** 62.62  
Total Difference 6.1340*** 14.78 100.00% 
gdp 2.3518*** 5.41 38.34% 
imex -0.0140 -0.77 -0.23% 
popu -0.1423*** -2.94 -2.32% 
currency 0.7833*** 4.25 12.77% 
law -0.0487 -1.08 -0.79% 
un -0.3530 -1.00 -5.75% 
Explainable Part 2.5771*** 6.73 42.01% 
Other Part 3.5569*** 12.12 57.99% 
Con. -8.4607** -2.22  
N 858   
*, **, *** present significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study applies a minimum spanning tree (MST) technique to develop an annual 
network structure of countries and regions and to identify systemically important 
regions (SIRs). The number of lines connected to each region and the HHI index were 
used to measure network interconnectedness and concentration. The SIRs and NSIRs 
are identified according to the interconnectedness of different regions. At the global 
level, we analyze the effect of network concentration on systemic risk. At the regional 
level, we proceed to study the effect of the number of connected lines on regional 
systemic risk. Finally, the main causes of the difference in interconnectedness 
between SIRs and NSIRs are identified using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
technique. 
In this study, we report the following three findings. First, there is a global network 
that connects all of the world’s regions, with pertinent data available on an annual 
basis. Systemic risk is transferred through the MST network. In the global network, 
the total number of lines does not change significantly in our sample years. However, 
this global network has become less concentrated. Its single pivotal center has given 
way to a multi-centered structure, and a similar transition is visible for the US in an 
earlier period. Second, the structure of the global network significantly affects 
systemic risk: the more concentrated the network, the higher the systemic risk. At the 
regional level, the more connected the NSIRs, the higher the systemic risk. However, 
for SIRs we do not find evidence showing that interconnectedness significantly 
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affects systemic risk. Therefore, the best approach for NSIRs to potentially increase 
their interconnectedness while protecting themselves from systemic risk is to 
transform themselves into SIRs. Third, by developing the economy through channels 
such as increasing GDP and strengthening the international status of their currencies, 
NSIRs can eventually evolve into SIRs. Also, a high population density benefits 
NSIRs by increasing their interconnectedness and making them less vulnerable to 
systemic risk.  
This is the first study to introduce the idea that systemic risk should be primarily 
measured at the global level instead of at the level of individual financial institutions. 
Our empirical results suggest that it is potentially beneficial, for global systemic risk 
management, to construct a less concentrated network with multiple centers, thus 
moderating the super pivotal status of the US. This lessening of network 
concentration can potentially mitigate global systemic risk by having the whole 
network more easily absorb risk through an increased number of SIRs. An increase of 
systemic risk for a few regions at the regional level can actually reduce aggregate 
systemic risk at the global level. Therefore, measuring systemic risk at the level of 
financial institutions could be problematic because it comes at the cost of increasing 
systemic risk for the entire system. These findings have important policy implications 
in the current era of globalization. 
We also pay specific attention to the Asia Pacific region, especially the Greater China 
area because it is now the second largest economic body in the world and the largest 
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emerging market. Mainland China is still struggling to become an SIR. During this 
study’s sample period, mainland China represents an SIR in 1992-1999, 2001-2005, 
2010, and 2012-2015, and an NSIR in 2000, 2006-2009, and 2011, suggesting that its 
SIR status is unstable over time. Mainland China should monitor the changes in its 
connections with other regions, track its status in the global network, guard against 
potentially negative effects, and aim to become a stable SIR. Our empirical evidence 
suggests that negative influence can be avoided or mitigated if a region becomes 
stronger and attains a higher global status. Hong Kong and Taiwan are both NSIRs 
and are generally only connect with mainland China. Thus, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
should closely monitor their connections with mainland China. All three regions are 
interconnected as a whole sub-system, and systemic risk from any one of them can 
spread to the others directly or indirectly. Meanwhile, Hong Kong and Taiwan might 
be exposed to systemic risk if they adopt an open policy without appropriate 
procedures. Our results suggest that NSIRs should establish mechanisms to defend 
against risk and maintain a reasonable level of interconnectedness with other regions.  
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